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Abstract
Since belief revision deals with the interaction of belief and information over time, branching-time temporal logic seems a natural
setting for a theory of belief change. We propose two extensions of a modal logic that, besides the next-time temporal operator,
contains a belief operator and an information operator. The first logic is shown to provide an axiomatic characterization of the first
six postulates of the AGM theory of belief revision, while the second, stronger, logic provides an axiomatic characterization of the
full set of AGM postulates.
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1. Introduction
There is an unsatisfactory lack of uniformity in the literature between how static beliefs and changes in beliefs are
modeled. Starting with Hintikka’s [12] seminal contribution, the notion of static belief has been studied mainly within
the context of modal logic. On the syntactic side a belief operator B is introduced, with the intended interpretation
of Bφ as “the individual believes that φ”. Various properties of beliefs are then expressed by means of axioms (for
example, the positive introspection axiom Bφ → BBφ, which says that if the individual believes φ then she believes
that she believes φ). On the semantic side Kripke structures (Kripke [15]) are used, consisting of a set of states (or
possible worlds) Ω together with a binary relation B on Ω , with the interpretation of αBβ as “at state α the individual
considers state β possible”. The connection between syntax and semantics is then obtained by means of a valuation
that associates with every atomic proposition p the set of states at which p is true. Rules are given for determining
the truth of an arbitrary formula at every state of a model; in particular, the formula Bφ is true at state α if and only if
φ is true at every ω such that αBω, that is, if φ is true at every state that the individual considers possible at α. Often
one can show that there is a correspondence between a syntactic axiom and a property of the accessibility relation, in
the sense that every instance of the axiom is true at every state of every model whose accessibility relation satisfies
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the relation B).
On the other hand, in their seminal contribution on belief revision, Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [1]
model beliefs as sets of formulas in a given syntactic language and belief revision is construed as an operation that
associates with every belief set K (thought of as the initial beliefs) and formula φ (thought of as new information)
a new belief set K∗φ representing the revised beliefs. Several requirements are imposed on this operator in order to
capture the notion of “rational” belief change. Their approach has become known as the AGM theory of belief revision
and has stimulated a large literature.
The purpose of this paper is to bridge the gap between these two strands of the literature, by representing the AGM
postulates as axioms in a modal language. Since belief revision deals with the interaction of belief and information
over time, temporal logic seems a natural starting point. Besides the next-time operator ©, our language contains a
belief operator B and an information operator I . The information operator is not a normal operator and is formally
similar to the “all I know” operator introduced by Levesque [16]. On the semantic side we consider branching-time
frames to represent different possible evolutions of beliefs. For every date t , beliefs and information are represented
by binary relations Bt and It on a set of states Ω . As in the static setting, the link between syntax and semantics is
provided by the notion of valuation and model. The truth of a formula in a model is defined at a state-instant pair (ω, t).
The first logic that we propose provides an axiomatic characterization of the first six AGM postulates (the so-called
“basic set”), in the following sense (Proposition 11):
(1) if K is the initial belief set, φ is a Boolean (i.e. non-modal) formula and K∗φ is the revised belief set that satisfies
the first six AGM postulates, then there is a model of the logic, a state α ∈ Ω and instants t1 and t2 such that: (i) t2
is an immediate successor of t1, (ii) the set of Boolean formulas that the individual believes at (α, t1) coincides with
K , (iii) the individual at time t2 and state α is informed that φ and (iv) the set of Boolean formulas that the individual
believes at (α, t2) coincides with K∗φ , and
(2) for every model that validates the logic, every state α and every instants t1 and t2 such that t2 is an immediate
successor of t1, if at time t2 and state α the individual is informed that φ (where φ is a consistent Boolean formula,
which is true at some state-instant pair) then K and K∗φ defined as the sets of Boolean formulas that the individual
believes at (α, t1) and (α, t2), respectively, satisfy the first six AGM postulates. (Furthermore, for every Boolean
formula φ there exists a model and a state-instant pair where the individual is informed that φ.)
The remaining two AGM postulates deal with comparing how the individual revises his beliefs after learning first
that φ and then that ψ with how he would revise his beliefs if he learned that φ ∧ψ . This is where the branching-time
structure that we use becomes important, since two different evolutions of beliefs need to be compared. The second
logic that we propose extends the first by adding two axioms, which correspond to the last two AGM postulates. We
show (Proposition 12) that the stronger logic provides an axiomatic characterization of the full set of AGM axioms,
in a sense analogous to the previous result.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we start with the semantics of temporal belief revision frames.
In Section 3 we introduce the basic logic and two extensions of it, which—in Section 4—are proved to provide
an axiomatic characterization of the first six and the full set of AGM postulates, respectively. Related literature is
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. The semantics
On the semantic side we consider branching-time structures with the addition of a belief relation and an information
relation for every instant t .
Definition 1. A next-time branching frame is a pair 〈T ,〉 where T is a (possibly infinite) set of instants or dates
and is a binary “precedence” relation on T satisfying the following properties: ∀t1, t2, t3 ∈ T ,
(1) uniqueness if t1 t3 and t2 t3 then t1 = t2,
(2) acyclicity if 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 is a sequence with ti ti+1
for every i = 1, . . . , n− 1, then tn 
= t1.
The interpretation of t1  t2 is that t2 is an immediate successor of t1 or t1 is the immediate predecessor of t2:
every instant has at most a unique immediate predecessor but can have several immediate successors.
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branching frame, Ω is a set of states (or possible worlds) and, for every t ∈ T , Bt and It are binary relations on Ω .
The interpretation of ωItω′ is that at state ω and time t—according to the information received—it is possible
that the true state is ω′. On the other hand, the interpretation of ωBtω′ is that at state ω and time t—in light of the
information received (if any)—the individual considers state ω′ possible (an alternative expression is “ω′ is a doxastic
alternative to ω at time t”). We shall use the following notation:
Bt (ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω: ωBtω′} and, similarly, It (ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω: ωItω′}.
Thus Bt (ω) is the set of states that are reachable from ω according to the relation Bt and similarly for It (ω).
Temporal belief frames can be used to describe either a situation where the objective facts describing the world
do not change—so that only the beliefs of the agent change over time—or a situation where both the facts and the
doxastic state of the agent change. In the computer science literature the first situation is called belief revision, while
the latter is called belief update (Katsuno and Mendelzon [13]). In this paper we restrict attention to belief revision.2
We consider a propositional language with five modal operators: the next-time operator © and it inverse ©−1, the
belief operator B , the information operator I and the “all state” operator A. The intended interpretation is as follows:
©φ: “at every next instant it will be the case that φ”
©−1φ: “at every previous instant it was the case that φ”
Bφ: “the agent believes that φ”
Iφ: “the agent is informed that φ”
Aφ: “it is true at every state that φ”.
The “all state” operator A is needed in order to capture the non-normality of the information operator I (see below).
For a thorough discussion of the “all state” operator see Goranko and Passy [11].
Given a temporal belief revision frame 〈T ,,Ω, {Bt }t∈T , {It }t∈T 〉 one obtains a model based on it by adding a
function V :S → 2Ω (where S is the set of atomic propositions and 2Ω denotes the set of subsets of Ω) that associates
with every atomic proposition q the set of states at which q is true. Note that defining a valuation this way is what
frames the problem as one of belief revision, since the truth value of an atomic proposition depends only on the state
and not on the time.3 Given a model, a state ω, an instant t and a formula φ, we write (ω, t) |= φ to denote that φ
is true at state ω and time t . Let ‖φ‖ denote the truth set of φ, that is, ‖φ‖ = {(ω, t) ∈ Ω × T : (ω, t) |= φ} and let
φt ⊆ Ω denote the set of states at which φ is true at time t , that is, φt = {ω ∈ Ω: (ω, t) |= φ}. Truth at a pair
(ω, t) is defined recursively as follows.
if q ∈ S, (ω, t) |= q if and only if ω ∈ V (q).
(ω, t) |= ¬φ if and only if (ω, t)  φ.
(ω, t) |= φ ∨ψ if and only if either (ω, t) |= φ or (ω, t) |= ψ (or both).
(ω, t) |= ©φ if and only if (ω, t ′) |= φ for every t ′ such that t t ′.
(ω, t) |= ©−1φ if and only if (ω, t ′′) |= φ for every t ′′ such that t ′′ t .
(ω, t) |= Bφ if and only if Bt (ω) ⊆ φt , that is,
if (ω′, t) |= φ for all ω′ ∈ Bt (ω).
(ω, t) |= Iφ if and only if It (ω) = φt , that is, if (1) (ω′, t) |= φ
for all ω′ ∈ It (ω), and (2) if (ω′, t) |= φ then ω′ ∈ It (ω).
(ω, t) |= Aφ if and only if φt = Ω , that is, if (ω′, t) |= φ for all ω′ ∈ Ω.
Note that, while the truth condition for the operator B is the standard one, the truth condition for the operator I is
non-standard: instead of simply requiring that It (ω) ⊆ φt we require equality: It (ω) = φt . Thus our information
operator is formally similar to the “all I know” operator introduced by Levesque [16], although the interpretation is
different.
2 For example, our analysis would be appropriate to model the evolving beliefs of an archaeologist who is trying to learn what truly happened
several thousand years ago. New archaeological discoveries provide clues and information about the past, which the scientist uses to update his
beliefs. However, the facts he is trying to learn do not change: their truth value was fixed in the distant past.
3 Belief update would require a valuation to be defined as a function V :S → 2Ω×T .
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is valid in a frame if it is valid in every model based on it.
3. The basic logic and two extensions
The formal language is built in the usual way (see [4]) from a countable set of atomic propositions, the connectives
¬ and ∨ (from which the connectives ∧, → and ↔ are defined as usual) and the modal operators ©, ©−1, B , I
and A. Let φ def= ¬©¬φ, and −1φ def= ¬©−1 ¬φ. Thus the interpretation of φ is “at some next instant it will be
the case that φ” while the interpretation of −1φ is “at some previous instant it was the case that φ”.
We denote by L0 the basic logic of belief revision defined by the following axioms and rules of inference.
AXIOMS:
1. All propositional tautologies.
2. Axiom K for ©, ©−1, B and A:
(φ ∧(φ → ψ)) →ψ for  ∈ {©,©−1,B,A} (K)
3. Temporal axioms relating © and ©−1:
φ → ©−1φ (O1)
φ → ©−1φ (O2)
4. Backward Uniqueness axiom:
−1φ → ©−1φ (BU)
5. S5 axioms for A:
Aφ → φ (TA)
¬Aφ → A¬Aφ (5A)
6. Inclusion axiom for B (note the absence of an analogous axiom for I ):
Aφ → Bφ (InclB)
7. Axioms to capture the non-standard semantics for I :
(Iφ ∧ Iψ) → A(φ ↔ ψ) (I1)
A(φ ↔ ψ) → (Iφ ↔ Iψ) (I2)
RULES OF INFERENCE:
1. Modus Ponens:
φ, φ → ψ
ψ
(MP)
2. Necessitation for A, © and ©−1:
φ
φ for  ∈ {©,©
−1,A} (Nec).
Note that from MP, InclB and Necessitation for A one can derive necessitation for B ( φBφ ). On the other hand,
Necessitation for I is not a rule of inference of this logic (indeed it is not validity preserving).
Remark 3. By MP, axiom K and Necessitation, the following is a derived rule of inference for the operators ©, ©−1,
B and A: φ→ψφ→ψ for  ∈ {©,©−1,B,A}. We call this rule RK . On the other hand, rule RK is not a valid rule of
inference for the operator I (despite the fact that axiom K for I can be shown to be a theorem of L0).
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Proposition 4. Logic L0 is sound with respect to the class of temporal belief revision frames (see Definition 2), that
is, every theorem of L0 is valid in every model based on a temporal belief revision frame.
Our purpose is to model how the factual beliefs of an individual change over time in response to factual infor-
mation. Thus the axioms we introduce are restricted to Boolean formulas, which are formulas that do not contain
any modal operators. That is, Boolean formulas are defined recursively as follows: (1) every atomic proposition is a
Boolean formula, and (2) if φ and ψ are Boolean formulas then so are ¬φ and (φ ∨ψ). As the following proposition
shows, the truth value of a Boolean formula does not change over time: it is only a function of the state. We denote by
ΦB the set of Boolean formulas.
Proposition 5. Let φ ∈ ΦB . Fix an arbitrary model. Then, for every ω ∈ Ω and t, t ′ ∈ T , (ω, t) |= φ if and only if
(ω, t ′) |= φ. Hence, for all t, t ′ ∈ T , φt = φt ′ .
Proof. Fix arbitrary ω ∈ Ω and t, t ′ ∈ T . The proof is by induction on the complexity of φ. If φ = q , where q is an
atomic proposition, then (ω, t) |= q if and only if ω ∈ V (q) if and only if (ω, t ′) |= q . Suppose now that the statement
is true for ψ1 and for ψ2, that is, (ω, t) |= ψ1 if and only if (ω, t ′) |= ψ1 , and similarly for ψ2. We want to show that the
statement is true for ¬ψ1 and for (ψ1 ∨ ψ2). By definition, (ω, t) |= ¬ψ1 if and only if (ω, t)  ψ1. By the induction
hypothesis (ω, t)  ψ1 if and only if (ω, t ′)  ψ1. Hence (ω, t) |= ¬ψ1 if and only if (ω, t ′) |= ¬ψ1. By definition,
(ω, t) |= ψ1 ∨ψ2 if and only if either (ω, t) |= ψ1 or (ω, t) |= ψ2. By the induction hypothesis, (ω, t) |= ψ1 if and only
if (ω, t ′) |= ψ1, and (ω, t) |= ψ2 if and only if (ω, t ′) |= ψ2. Thus (ω, t) |= ψ1 ∨ψ2 if and only if (ω, t ′) |= ψ1 ∨ψ2.
Fix an arbitrary ω′ ∈ Ω . By definition of φt , ω′ ∈ φt if and only if (ω′, t) |= φ; by the result just proved,
(ω′, t) |= φ if and only if (ω′, t ′) |= φ and, by definition of φt ′ , (ω′, t ′) |= φ if and only if ω′ ∈ φt ′ . Thus φt =
φt ′ . 
We now introduce two sets of axioms that provide two extensions of logic L0, one of which will be shown to
correspond to the basic set of AGM postulates and the other to the full set. Note that all of the following axioms apply
only to Boolean formulas.
The first axiom says that factual information is believed. This is known in the literature as Success or Acceptance
(‘A’ stands for ‘Acceptance’): if φ is a Boolean formula,
Iφ → Bφ. (A)
The second axiom requires the individual not to drop any of his current factual beliefs at any next instant where he
is informed of some fact that he currently considers possible (‘ND’ stands for ‘Not Drop’): if φ and ψ are Boolean
formulas
(¬B¬φ ∧Bψ) → ©(Iφ → Bψ). (ND)
The third axiom requires that if the individual considers it possible that (φ ∧ ¬ψ), then at any next instant where
he is informed that φ he does not believe that ψ , that is, he cannot add new factual beliefs, unless they are implied by
the old beliefs and the information received (‘NA’ stands for ‘Not Add’):5 if φ and ψ are Boolean formulas,
¬B¬(φ ∧ ¬ψ) → ©(Iφ → ¬Bψ). (NA)
4 Completeness issues are not relevant for the results of this paper and are dealt with in a separate paper that studies several extensions of L0
besides the two considered here.
5 Axiom NA can alternatively be written as ¬B(φ → ψ) → ©(Iφ → ¬Bψ), which says that if the individual does not believe that whenever φ
is the case then ψ is the case, then—at any next instant—if he is informed that φ then he cannot believe that ψ . Another, propositionally equivalent,
formulation of NA is the following: (Iφ ∧ Bψ) → B(φ → ψ), which says that if there is a next instant at which the individual is informed that
φ and believes that ψ , then he must now believe that whenever φ is the case then ψ is the case.
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sense that he does not simultaneously believe a formula and its negation (‘WC’ stands for ‘Weak Consistency’): if φ
is a Boolean formula,
(Iφ ∧ ¬A¬φ) → (Bψ → ¬B¬ψ). (WC)
Turning back to the semantics, we call the following property of temporal belief revision frames “Qualitative Bayes
Rule” (QBR): ∀ω ∈ Ω,∀t1, t2 ∈ T ,
if t1 t2 and Bt1(ω)∩ It2(ω) 
= ∅ then Bt2(ω) = Bt1(ω) ∩ It2(ω). (QBR)
The expression “Qualitative Bayes Rule” is motivated by the following observation (see [5]). In a probabilistic setting,
let Pω,t1 be the probability measure over a set of states Ω representing the individual’s beliefs at state ω and time t1,
let F ⊆ Ω be an event representing the information received by the individual at a later date t2 and let Pω,t2 be
the posterior probability measure representing the revised beliefs at state ω and date t2. Bayes’ rule requires that, if
Pω,t1(F ) > 0, then, for every event E ⊆ Ω , Pω,t2(E) = Pω,t1 (E∩F)Pω,t1 (F ) . Bayes’ rule thus implies the following (where
supp(P ) denotes the support of the probability measure P ):
if supp(Pω,t1)∩ F 
= ∅, then supp(Pω,t2) = supp(Pω,t1) ∩ F.
If we set Bt1(ω) = supp(Pω,t1), F = It2(ω), with t1  t2, and Bt2(ω) = supp(Pω,t2) then we get the Qualitative
Bayes Rule as stated above. Thus in a probabilistic setting the proposition “at date t the individual believes φ” would
be interpreted as “the individual assigns probability 1 to the event φt ⊆ Ω”.
Let Lb be the logic obtained by adding the above four axioms to the basic logic L0. We denote this by writing
Lb = L0 +A+ ND+ NA + WC (the subscript ‘b’ was chosen because, as shown later, logic Lb provides an axiomatic
characterization of the basic set of AGM postulates).
Definition 6. An Lb-frame is a temporal belief revision frame that satisfies the following properties:
(1) the Qualitative Bayes Rule,
(2) ∀ω ∈ Ω , ∀t ∈ T , Bt (ω) ⊆ It (ω),
(3) ∀ω ∈ Ω , ∀t ∈ T , if It (ω) 
= ∅ then Bt (ω) 
= ∅.
An Lb-model is a model based on an Lb-frame.
Proposition 7. Logic Lb is sound with respect to the class of Lb-frames. That is, every theorem of Lb is valid in every
Lb-model.
Proof. By Proposition 4 it is enough to show that the four axioms A, ND, NA and WC are valid in an arbitrary model
based on a frame that satisfies the three properties of Definition 6. Fix an arbitrary such model.
Validity of A. Fix arbitrary α ∈ Ω , t ∈ T and φ ∈ ΦB and suppose that (α, t) |= Iφ. Then It (α) = φt . Hence,
by property (2) of Definition 6, Bt (α) ⊆ φt , that is, (α, t) |= Bφ.
Validity of ND. Fix arbitrary α ∈ Ω , t1 ∈ T and φ,ψ ∈ ΦB and suppose that (α, t1) |= ¬B¬φ ∧ Bψ . Fix an
arbitrary t2 ∈ T such that t1 t2 and suppose that (α, t2) |= Iφ. Then It2(α) = φt2 . Since (α, t1) |= ¬B¬φ, there
exists a β ∈ Bt1(α) such that (β, t1) |= φ. Since φ is Boolean, by Proposition 5, (β, t2) |= φ so that β ∈ It2(α).
Thus Bt1(α) ∩ It2(α) 
= ∅ and, by QBR, Bt2(α) ⊆ Bt1(α). Fix an arbitrary ω ∈ Bt2(α). Then ω ∈ Bt1(α) and, since
(α, t1) |= Bψ , (ω, t1) |= ψ . Since ψ is Boolean, by Proposition 5, (ω, t2) |= ψ . Hence, since ω ∈ Bt2(α) was chosen
arbitrarily, (α, t2) |= Bψ .
Validity of NA. Fix arbitrary α ∈ Ω , t1 ∈ T and φ,ψ ∈ ΦB and suppose that (α, t1) |= ¬B¬(φ ∧ ¬ψ). Fix an
arbitrary t2 ∈ T such that t1 t2 and suppose that (α, t2) |= Iφ . Then It2(α) = φt2 . Since (α, t1) |= ¬B¬(φ∧¬ψ),
there exists a β ∈ Bt1(α) such that (β, t1) |= φ ∧¬ψ . Since φ and ψ are Boolean, by Proposition 5, (β, t2) |= φ ∧¬ψ .
Thus β ∈ It2(α), so that β ∈ Bt1(α) ∩ It2(α). By QBR , β ∈ Bt2(α). Thus, since (β, t2) |= ¬ψ , (α, t2) |= ¬Bψ .
Validity of WC. Fix arbitrary α ∈ Ω , t ∈ T and φ ∈ ΦB and suppose that (α, t) |= Iφ ∧¬A¬φ. Then It (α) = φt
and there exists a β such that (β, t) |= φ. Thus It (α) 
= ∅ and, by property (3) of Definition 6, Bt (α) 
= ∅. Fix an
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= ∅, there exists a γ ∈ Bt (α). Thus (γ, t) |= ψ and
hence (α, t) |= ¬B¬ψ . 
We now strengthen logic Lb by adding two more axioms.
The first axiom says that if there is a next instant where the individual is informed that φ ∧ ψ and believes that χ ,
then at every next instant it must be the case that if the individual is informed that φ then he must believe that
(φ ∧ ψ) → χ (we call this axiom K7 because, as we will show later, it corresponds to AGM postulate (K*7)): if φ,
ψ and χ are Boolean formulas,
(I (φ ∧ψ)∧Bχ) → ©(Iφ → B((φ ∧ψ) → χ)). (K7)
The second axiom says that if there is a next instant where the individual is informed that φ, considers φ ∧ ψ
possible and believes that ψ → χ , then at every next instant it must be the case that if he is informed that φ ∧ψ then
he believes that χ (we call this axiom K8 because it corresponds to AGM postulate (K*8)): if φ, ψ and χ are Boolean
formulas,
(Iφ ∧ ¬B¬(φ ∧ψ)∧B(ψ → χ)) → ©(I (φ ∧ψ) → Bχ). (K8)
Let LAGM be the logic obtained by adding the above two axioms to Lb . Thus LAGM = L0 +A+ ND + NA + WC +
K7 + K8 (the subscript ‘AGM’ was chosen because, as shown later, logic LAGM provides an axiomatic characteriza-
tion of the full set of AGM postulates).
Definition 8. An LAGM-frame is an Lb-frame (see Definition 6) that satisfies the following additional property:
∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀t1, t2, t3 ∈ T ,
if t1 t2, t1 t3, It3(ω) ⊆ It2(ω) and It3(ω)∩Bt2(ω) 
= ∅
then Bt3(ω) = It3(ω)∩Bt2(ω). (CAB)
An LAGM-model is a model based on an LAGM-frame.6
Proposition 9. Logic LAGM is sound with respect to the class of LAGM-frames. That is, every theorem of LAGM is valid
in every LAGM-model.
Proof. By Proposition 7 and Definition 8 it is sufficient to show that axioms K7 and K8 are valid in an arbitrary
model based on an Lb frame that satisfies CAB. Fix an arbitrary such model.
Validity of K7. Fix arbitrary α ∈ Ω and t1 ∈ T and suppose that (a, t1) |=(I (φ ∧ ψ) ∧ Bχ), where φ, ψ and χ
are Boolean formulas. Then there exists a t3 such that t1 t3 and (α, t3) |= I (φ∧ψ)∧Bχ . Then It3(α) = φ∧ψt3 .
Fix an arbitrary t2 such that t1 t2 and suppose that (α, t2) |= Iφ. Then It2(α) = φt2 . Since φ and ψ are Boolean,
by Proposition 5 φ ∧ ψt3 = φ ∧ ψt2 . Thus, since φ ∧ ψt2 ⊆ φt2 , It3(α) ⊆ It2(α). If It3(α) ∩ Bt2(α) = ∅,
then, for every ω ∈ Bt2(α), (ω, t2) |= ¬(φ ∧ ψ) and thus (ω, t2) |= (φ ∧ ψ) → χ , so that (α, t2) |= B((φ ∧ ψ) → χ).
If, on the other hand, It3(α) ∩ Bt2(α) 
= ∅, then, by CAB, Bt3(α) = It3(α) ∩ Bt2(α). Fix an arbitrary β ∈ Bt2(α). If
(β, t2) |= ¬(φ ∧ ψ) then (β, t2) |= (φ ∧ ψ) → χ . If (β, t2) |= φ ∧ ψ , then, by Proposition 5, (β, t3) |= φ ∧ ψ and,
therefore, β ∈ It3(α). Hence β ∈ Bt3(α). Since (α, t3) |= Bχ , (β, t3) |= χ and, therefore, (β, t3) |= (φ ∧ ψ) → χ .
Since (φ ∧ ψ → χ) is Boolean (because φ, ψ and χ are), by Proposition 5, (β, t2) |= (φ ∧ ψ) → χ . Thus, since
β ∈ Bt2(α) was chosen arbitrarily, (α, t2) |= B((φ ∧ ψ) → χ).
Validity of K8. Fix arbitrary α ∈ Ω and t1 ∈ T and suppose that (α, t1) |=(Iφ ∧ ¬B¬(φ ∧ ψ) ∧ B(ψ → χ)),
where φ, ψ and χ are Boolean formulas. Then there exists a t2 such that t1 t2 and (α, t2) |= Iφ ∧ ¬B¬(φ ∧ ψ) ∧
B(ψ → χ). Thus It2(α) = φt2 and there exists a β ∈ Bt2(α) such that (β, t2) |= φ ∧ψ . Fix an arbitrary t3 such that
t1 t3 and suppose that (α, t3) |= I (φ∧ψ). Then It3(α) = φ∧ψt3 . Since φ∧ψ is a Boolean formula and (β, t2) |=
φ ∧ ψ , by Proposition 5 (β, t3) |= φ ∧ ψ and therefore β ∈ It3(α). Hence It3(α) ∩ Bt2(α) 
= ∅. Furthermore, since
6
‘CAB’ stands for ‘Comparison Across Branches’. This property says that if t2 and t3 are immediate successors of t1 and the set of states that are
possible according to the information received at (state ω and) time t3 is a subset of the set of states that are possible according to the information
received at (state ω and) time t2 and, furthermore, the information received at time t3 is compatible with the beliefs held at time t2, then the beliefs
at time t3 must coincide with the intersection of the information at time t3 and the beliefs at time t2.
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by CAB, Bt3(α) = It3(α) ∩ Bt2(α). Fix an arbitrary γ ∈ Bt3(α). Then γ ∈ Bt2(α) and, since (α, t2) |= B(ψ → χ),
(γ, t2) |= (ψ → χ). Since (ψ → χ) is a Boolean formula, by Proposition 5 (γ, t3) |= (ψ → χ). Since Bt3(α) ⊆ It3(α)
(by definition of Lb-frame) and It3(α) = φ ∧ ψt3 , (γ, t3) |= ψ . Thus (γ, t3) |= χ . Hence, since γ ∈ Bt3(α) was
chosen arbitrarily, (α, t3) |= Bχ . 
We end this section with a lemma that will be used later.
Lemma 10. In any logic where B is a normal operator (that is, it satisfies axiom K and the rule of necessitation) the
following is a theorem:
(Bφ ∧ ¬B¬ψ) → ¬B¬(φ ∧ψ).
Proof. (‘PL’ stands for ‘Propositional Logic’)
1. Bφ ∧ B(φ → ¬ψ) → B¬ψ axiom K
2. Bφ → (B(φ → ¬ψ) → B¬ψ) 1, PL
3. (B(φ → ¬ψ) → B¬ψ) → (¬B¬ψ → ¬B(φ → ¬ψ)) tautology
4. Bφ → (¬B¬ψ → ¬B(φ → ¬ψ)) 2, 3, PL
5. (Bφ ∧ ¬B¬ψ) → ¬B(φ → ¬ψ) 4, PL
6. ¬(φ ∧ψ) → (φ → ¬ψ) tautology
7. B¬(φ ∧ψ) → B(φ → ¬ψ) 6, RK (see Remark 3)
8. ¬B(φ → ¬ψ) → ¬B¬(φ ∧ψ) 7, PL
9. (Bφ ∧ ¬B¬ψ) → ¬B¬(φ ∧ψ) 5, 8, PL. 
4. Axiomatic characterization of AGM
The AGM theory of belief revision was developed within the framework of belief sets. Let Γ be the set of formulas
in a propositional language. Given a subset F ⊆ Γ , its PL-deductive closure [F ]PL is defined as follows: ψ ∈ [F ]PL if
and only if there exist φ1, . . . , φn ∈ F such that (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧φn) → ψ is a tautology (that is, a theorem of Propositional
Logic). A set F ⊆ Γ is consistent if [F ]PL 
= Γ (equivalently, if there is no formula φ such that both φ and ¬φ belong
to [F ]PL). A set F ⊆ Γ is deductively closed if F = [F ]PL. Given a consistent and deductively closed set K (thought
of as the initial beliefs of the individual) and a formula φ (thought of as a new piece of information), the revision of K
by φ, denoted by K∗φ , is a subset of Γ that satisfies the following conditions, known as the AGM postulates:
(K*1) K∗φ is deductively closed
(K*2) φ ∈ K∗φ
(K*3) K∗φ ⊆ [K ∪ {φ}]PL
(K*4) if ¬φ /∈ K, then [K ∪ {φ}]PL ⊆ K∗φ
(K*5) K∗φ = Γ if and only if φ is a contradiction
(K*6) if φ ↔ ψ is a tautology then K∗φ = K∗ψ
(K*7) K∗φ∧ψ ⊆ [K∗φ ∪ {ψ}]PL
(K*8) if ¬ψ /∈ K∗φ, then [K∗φ ∪ {ψ}]PL ⊆ K∗φ∧ψ.
(K*1) requires the revised belief set to be deductively closed. In our framework this corresponds to requiring the
B operator to be a normal operator, that is, to satisfy axiom K and the inference rule Necessitation.
(K*2) requires that the information be believed. In our framework, this corresponds to the Acceptance axiom (for
Boolean φ): Iφ → Bφ.
(K*3) says that beliefs should be revised minimally, in the sense that no new belief should be added unless it can
be deduced from the information received and the initial beliefs. As shown below, this requirement corresponds to our
axiom NA (for Boolean φ and ψ ): ¬B¬(φ ∧ ¬ψ) → ©(Iφ → ¬Bψ).
(K*4) says that if the information received is compatible with the initial beliefs, then any formula that can be
deduced from the information and the initial beliefs should be part of the revised beliefs. As shown below, this
requirement corresponds to our axiom ND (for Boolean φ and ψ ): (¬B¬φ ∧Bψ) → ©(Iφ → Bψ).
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tautology). This corresponds to our axiom WC (for Boolean φ): (Iφ ∧ ¬A¬φ) → (Bψ → ¬B¬ψ).
(K*6) is automatically satisfied in our framework, since if φ ↔ ψ is a tautology then ‖φ‖ = ‖ψ‖ in every model
and therefore the formula Iφ ↔ Iψ is valid. Hence revision based on φ must coincide with revision based on ψ .
(K*7) and (K*8) are a generalization of (K*3) and (K*4) that
“applies to iterated changes of belief. The idea is that if K∗φ is a revision of K and K∗φ is to be changed by adding
further sentences, such a change should be made by using expansions of K∗φ whenever possible. More generally,
the minimal change of K to include both φ and ψ (that is, K∗φ∧ψ ) ought to be the same as the expansion of K∗φ
by ψ , so long as ψ does not contradict the beliefs in K∗φ” (Gärdenfors [10, p. 55]).7
We will show below that (K*7) corresponds to our axiom K7 and (K*8) to axiom K8.
The set of postulates (K*1) through (K*6) is called the basic set of postulates for belief revision (Gärdenfors [10,
p. 55]). The following proposition shows that logic Lb characterizes this basic set.
Proposition 11. Logic Lb provides an axiomatic characterization of the set of basic AGM postulates (K*1)–(K*6), in
the sense that both (A) and (B) below hold (recall that ΦB denotes the subset of Boolean formulas):
(A) Let K ⊆ ΦB be a consistent and deductively closed set and φ ∈ ΦB . If K∗φ ⊆ ΦB satisfies AGM postulates
(K*1)–(K*6) then there exist an Lb-model, t1, t2 ∈ T and α ∈ Ω such that
(A.1) t1 t2,
(A.2) K = {ψ ∈ ΦB : (α, t1) |= Bψ},
(A.3) (α, t2) |= Iφ,
(A.4) K∗φ = {ψ ∈ ΦB : (α, t2) |= Bψ},
(A.5) if φ is consistent then (β, t) |= φ for some β ∈ Ω and t ∈ T .
(B) Fix an Lb-model such that (1) for some t1, t2 ∈ T , α ∈ Ω and φ ∈ ΦB , t1  t2 and (α, t2) |= Iφ and (2) if
φ is not a contradiction, then (β, t) |= φ, for some β ∈ Ω and t ∈ T .8 Define K = {ψ ∈ ΦB : (α, t1) |= Bψ} and
K∗φ = {ψ ∈ ΦB : (α, t2) |= Bψ}. Then K∗φ satisfies AGM postulates (K*1)–(K*6). Furthermore, for every φ ∈ ΦB ,
there exists an Lb-model such that (1) (α, t0) |= Iφ, for some α ∈ Ω and t0 ∈ T , and (2) if φ is not a contradiction
then (β, t) |= φ, for some β ∈ Ω and t ∈ T .
Proof. (A) First we prove that if K ⊆ ΦB is a consistent and deductively closed set, φ ∈ ΦB and K∗φ ⊆ ΦB satisfies
AGM postulates (K*1)–(K*6) then there is an Lb-model, t1, t2 ∈ T and α ∈ Ω such that (A.1)–(A.5) are satisfied.
Let MPLB be the set of maximally consistent sets of formulas for a propositional logic whose set of formulas is ΦB .
For any F ⊆ ΦB let MF = {ω ∈ MPLB : F ⊆ ω}. By Lindenbaum’s lemma, MF 
= ∅ if and only if F is a consistent set,
that is, [F ]PL 
= ΦB . To simplify the notation, for ψ ∈ ΦB we write Mψ rather than M{ψ}.
Define the following belief revision frame: T = {t1, t2},= {(t1, t2)}, Ω = MPLB and, for every ω ∈ Ω ,
Bt1(ω) = It1(ω) = MK
It2(ω) =
{ ∅ if φ is a contradiction
Mφ otherwise
Bt2(ω) =
⎧⎨
⎩
∅ if φ is a contradiction
Mφ ∩ MK if φ is consistent and Mφ ∩ MK 
= ∅
MK∗φ if φ is consistent and Mφ ∩ MK = ∅.
7 The expansion of K∗φ by ψ is [K∗φ ∪ {ψ}]PL .
8 In an arbitrary model, if φ is not a contradiction, there is not guarantee that (β, t) |= φ for some (β, t). However, as shown below, for every
consistent Boolean formula, there exists an Lb-model where the formula is true at some state-instant pair (β , t). Given a consistent Boolean formula
φ, letMφ be such a model. LetM be an arbitrary Lb-model. By taking the union ofM andMφ one can transform the former into a model that
satisfies the hypothesis that φ is true at some state-instant pair (β, t).
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The Qualitative Bayes Rule is clearly satisfied, since Bt1(ω) ∩ It2(ω) 
= ∅ if and only if Mφ ∩ MK 
= ∅, in which
case Bt2(ω) = Mφ ∩ MK = It2(ω)∩Bt1(ω).
The property that Bt (ω) ⊆ It (ω) (for every ω and t) is also satisfied: the only case where, possibly, Bt (ω) 
= It (ω)
is when t = t2 and φ is a consistent formula. In this case, there are two possibilities: (1) Mφ ∩ MK 
= ∅ and (2)
Mφ ∩ MK = ∅. In case (1) Bt2(ω) = Mφ ∩ MK ⊆ Mφ = It2(ω). In case (2) Bt2(ω) = MK∗φ and It2(ω) = Mφ . Now, if
ω′ ∈ MK∗φ then K∗φ ⊆ ω′ and, since by AGM postulate (K*2), φ ∈ K∗φ , it follows that φ ∈ ω′, that is, ω′ ∈ Mφ . Hence
MK∗φ ⊆ Mφ .
Finally, the property that, for every ω and t , Bt (ω) 
= ∅ whenever It (ω) 
= ∅ is also satisfied. If t = t1, trivially
because Bt1(ω) = It1(ω). If t = t2, It2(ω) 
= ∅ if and only if φ is a consistent formula; in this case either Bt2(ω) =
Mφ ∩ MK , if Mφ ∩ MK 
= ∅, or Bt2(ω) = MK∗φ , in which case by AGM postulate (K*5) K∗φ is a consistent set and
therefore, by Lindenbaum’s lemma, MK∗φ 
= ∅.
Now define the following model based on this frame: for every atomic proposition q , for every ω ∈ Ω and for every
t ∈ T , (ω, t) |= q if and only if q ∈ ω. First we prove that, for every ψ ∈ ΦB ,
∀t ∈ T , ψt = Mψ, that is, ∀ω ∈ Ω, (ω, t) |= ψ if and only if ψ ∈ ω. (1)
The proof is by induction on the complexity of ψ . If ψ = q , for some atomic proposition q , then the statement is true
by construction. Now suppose that the statement is true of ψ1,ψ2 ∈ ΦB ; we want to show that it is true for ¬ψ1 and for
(ψ1 ∨ ψ2). By definition, (ω, t) |= ¬ψ1 if and only if (ω, t)  ψ1 if and only if (by the induction hypothesis) ψ1 /∈ ω
if and only if (by definition of MCS) ¬ψ1 ∈ ω. By definition, (ω, t) |= (ψ1 ∨ ψ2) if and only if either (ω, t) |= ψ1, in
which case, by the induction hypothesis, ψ1 ∈ ω, or (ω, t) |= ψ2, in which case, by the induction hypothesis, ψ2 ∈ ω.
By definition of MCS, (ψ1 ∨ψ2) ∈ ω if and only if either ψ1 ∈ ω or ψ2 ∈ ω.
Note also the following (see Theorem 2.20 in Chellas [6, p. 57]): ∀F ⊆ ΦB,∀ψ ∈ ΦB ,
ψ ∈ [F ]PL if and only if ψ ∈ ω, ∀ω ∈ MF . (2)
Now, fix an arbitrary α ∈ Ω . We want to show that properties (A.1)–(A.5) are satisfied.
(A.1): t1 t2 by construction.
(A.2): we need to show that K = {ψ ∈ ΦB : (α, t1) |= Bψ}. First we show that K ⊆ {ψ ∈ ΦB : (α, t1) |= Bψ}. Let
ψ ∈ K . Then ψ ∈ ω for every ω ∈ MK , that is, MK ⊆ Mψ . Thus, since, by construction, Bt1(α) = MK and, by (1),
Mψ = ψt1 it follows that Bt1(α) ⊆ ψt1 , that is, (α, t1) |= Bψ . Next we show that {ψ ∈ ΦB : (α, t1) |= Bψ} ⊆ K .
Let ψ ∈ ΦB be such that (α, t1) |= Bψ . Then Bt1(α) ⊆ ψt1 . Since, by construction, Bt1(α) = MK , and, by (1),
Mψ = ψt1 it follows that MK ⊆ Mψ , that is, ψ ∈ ω for every ω ∈ MK ; hence, by (2), ψ ∈ [K]PL. By hypothesis,
K is deductively closed, that is, K = [K]PL. Hence ψ ∈ K .
(A.3): we need to show that (α, t2) |= Iφ. By (1) φt2 = Mφ . Since, by construction, It2(α) = Mφ , it follows that
(α, t2) |= Iφ.
(A.4): we need to show that K∗φ = {ψ ∈ ΦB : (α, t2) |= Bψ}. There are several cases to be considered.
(4.i) φ is a contradiction. Then, by AGM postulate (K*5), K∗φ = ΦB and, by construction, Bt2(α) = ∅, so that
(α, t2) |= Bψ for every formula ψ . Hence {ψ ∈ ΦB : (α, t2) |= Bψ} = ΦB = K∗φ .
(4.ii) φ is consistent and Mφ ∩MK = ∅. In this case, by construction, Bt2(α) = MK∗φ . If ψ ∈ K∗φ then MK∗φ ⊆ Mψ .
By (1) Mψ = ψt2 . Thus Bt2(α) ⊆ ψt2 , that is, (α, t2) |= Bψ . Conversely, if (α, t2) |= Bψ then Bt2(α) ⊆ ψt2 ,
and, since Bt2(α) = MK∗φ and, by (1), ψt2 = Mψ , it follows that MK∗φ ⊆ Mψ , that is, ψ ∈ ω for all ω ∈ MK∗φ , so
that, by (2), ψ ∈ [K∗φ]PL. By AGM postulate (K*1), K∗φ = [K∗φ]PL. Thus ψ ∈ K∗φ .
(4.iii) φ is consistent and Mφ ∩ MK 
= ∅, in which case Bt2(α) = Mφ ∩ MK . First of all, note that Mφ ∩ MK =
MK∪{φ}. Secondly, it must be that ¬φ /∈ K (if ¬φ ∈ K then ¬φ ∈ ω for every ω ∈ MK and therefore Mφ ∩ MK = ∅).
Hence, by AGM postulates (K*3) and (K*4), K∗φ = [K ∪ {φ}]PL. By (2), for every Boolean formula ψ , ψ ∈
[K ∪ {φ}]PL if and only if ψ ∈ ω, for all ω ∈ MK∪{φ}. Thus ψ ∈ K∗φ = [K ∪ {φ}]PL if and only if ψ ∈ ω for
all ω ∈ MK∪{φ} = Mφ ∩ MK = Bt2(α). By (1), for every ω ∈ Ω , ψ ∈ ω if and only if (ω, t2) |= ψ . Hence
K∗φ = {ψ ∈ ΦB : (α, t2) |= Bψ}.
(A.5): we need to show that, if φ is consistent, then (β, t) |= φ for some β ∈ Ω and t ∈ T . If φ is consistent, then,
by Lindenbaum’s lemma, there exists a β ∈ MPL such that φ ∈ β . By (1), (β, t) |= φ for all t ∈ T .B
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if φ is not a contradiction, then (β, t) |= φ, for some β ∈ Ω and t ∈ T . Let K = {ψ ∈ ΦB : (α, t1) |= Bψ} and
K∗φ = {ψ ∈ ΦB : (α, t2) |= Bψ}. We need to prove that AGM postulates (K*1)–(K*6) are satisfied.
(K*1): we need to show that K∗φ is deductively closed, that is, K∗φ = [K∗φ]PL. If ψ ∈ K∗φ then ψ ∈ [K∗φ]PL, because
ψ → ψ is a tautology. Now let ψ ∈ [K∗φ]PL. Then there exist φ1, . . . , φn ∈ K∗φ such that (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn) → ψ is a
tautology, hence a theorem of Lb . Then, by necessitation for B and Proposition 7, (α, t2) |= B((φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn) →
ψ). By definition of K∗φ , since φ1, . . . , φn ∈ K∗φ , (α, t2) |= B(φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn). By axiom K for B and Proposition 7,
(α, t2) |= B((φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn) → ψ)∧B(φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn) → Bψ . Thus (α, t2) |= Bψ , that is, ψ ∈ K∗φ .
(K*2): we need to show that φ ∈ K∗φ , that is, (α, t2) |= Bφ. By axiom A and Proposition 7, (α, t2) |= Iφ → Bφ and
by hypothesis (α, t2) |= Iφ. Thus (α, t2) |= Bφ.
(K*3): we need to show that K∗φ ⊆ [K ∪ {φ}]PL. Let ψ ∈ K∗φ , i.e. (α, t2) |= Bψ . First of all, note that axiom
NA is propositionally equivalent to (Iφ ∧ Bψ) → B(φ → ψ). Thus, by Proposition 7, (α, t1) |=(Iφ ∧ Bψ) →
B(φ → ψ). By hypothesis, t1  t2 and (α, t2) |= Iφ ∧ Bψ . Thus (α, t1) |= (Iφ ∧ Bψ) and, therefore, (α, t1) |=
B(φ → ψ), that is (φ → ψ) ∈ K . Hence {φ, (φ → ψ)} ⊆ K ∪ {φ} so that, since (φ ∧ (φ → ψ)) → ψ is a tautology,
ψ ∈ [K ∪ {φ}]PL.
(K*4): we need to show that if ¬φ /∈ K then [K ∪ {φ}]PL ⊆ K∗φ . Suppose that ¬φ /∈ K , that is, (α, t1) |= ¬B¬φ.
First of all, note that axiom ND is propositionally equivalent to ¬B¬φ → (Bψ → ©(Iφ → Bψ)). Thus, by Propo-
sition 7, (α, t1) |= ¬B¬φ → (Bψ → ©(Iφ → Bψ)). Hence
(α, t1) |= Bψ → ©(Iφ → Bψ), for every Boolean formula ψ. (3)
Let χ ∈ [K ∪ {φ}]PL, that is, there exist φ1, . . . , φn ∈ K ∪ {φ} such that (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn) → χ is a tautology. We
want to show that χ ∈ K∗φ , i.e. (α, t2) |= Bχ . Since (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn) → χ is a tautology, by necessitation for B and
Proposition 7, (α, t1) |= B((φ1 ∧ · · ·∧φn) → χ). If φi ∈ K for every i = 1, . . . , n, then (α, t1) |= B(φ1 ∧ · · ·∧φn) and
therefore (using axiom K for B and Proposition 7) (α, t1) |= Bχ . Thus, by (3), (α, t1) |= ©(Iφ → Bχ) so that, since
t1 t2, (α, t2) |= Iφ → Bχ . Since, by hypothesis, (α, t2) |= Iφ, it follows that (α, t2) |= Bχ , i.e. χ ∈ K∗φ . If φi /∈ K ,
for some i = 1, . . . , n then we can assume (renumbering the formulas, if necessary) that φn /∈ K , which implies
(since φi ∈ K ∪ {φ} for all i = 1, . . . , n) that φn = φ, and φ1, . . . , φn−1 ∈ K , so that (α, t1) |= B(φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn−1).
Since, by hypothesis, (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn−1 ∧ φ) → χ is a tautology and is propositionally equivalent to (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧
φn−1) → (φ → χ), by necessitation for B and Proposition 7 (α, t1) |= B((φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn−1) → (φ → χ)). Thus
(α, t1) |= B(φ → χ) (appealing, once again, to axiom K for B and Proposition 7). Hence, by (3) (with ψ = (φ → χ)),
(α, t1) |= ©(Iφ → B(φ → χ)). Since t1  t2, (α, t2) |= Iφ → B(φ → χ). By hypothesis, α |= Iφ and by (K*2)
(proved above), (α, t2) |= Bφ. Thus (α, t2) |= B(φ → χ) ∧ Bφ. By axiom K and Proposition 7, (α, t2) |= (B(φ →
χ) ∧Bφ) → Bχ . Hence (α, t2) |= Bχ , i.e. χ ∈ K∗φ .
(K*5): we have to show that K∗φ 
= ΦB unless φ is a contradiction (that is, ¬φ is a tautology). If φ is a contradiction,
then ‖φ‖ = ∅ and therefore, since, by hypothesis, (α, t2) |= Iφ, It2(α) = ∅. By definition of Lb-model, Bt2(α) ⊆
It2(α). Thus Bt2(α) = ∅ so that (α, t2) |= Bψ for every formula ψ . Hence K∗φ = ΦB . If φ is not a contradiction, then
by hypothesis, (β, t) |= φ, for some (β, t). Since φ is Boolean, by Proposition 5, (β, t2) |= φ. Thus (α, t2) |= ¬A¬φ.
By hypothesis, (α, t2) |= Iφ. Thus (α, t2) |= Iφ∧¬A¬φ. By axiom WC and Proposition 7, (α, t2) |= (Iφ∧¬A¬φ) →
(Bψ → ¬B¬ψ). Thus (α, t2) |= Bψ → ¬B¬ψ for every formula ψ , that is, if ψ ∈ K∗φ then ¬ψ /∈ K∗φ . Since, by
(K*2), φ ∈ K∗φ , it follows that ¬φ /∈ K∗φ and therefore K∗φ 
= ΦB .
(K*6): we have to show that if φ ↔ ψ is a tautology then K∗φ = K∗ψ . If φ ↔ ψ is a tautology, then ‖φ ↔ ψ‖ =
Ω × T , so that φt2 = ψt2 . Thus It2(α) = φt2 if and only if It2(α) = ψt2 , that is, (α, t2) |= Iφ if and only if
(α, t2) |= Iψ . Hence, by definition, K∗φ = K∗ψ .9
It remains to show that, for every φ ∈ ΦB , there exists an Lb-model such that (1) (α, t0) |= Iφ, for some α ∈ Ω
and t0 ∈ T and (2) if φ is not a contradiction then (β, t) |= φ, for some β ∈ Ω and t ∈ T . Fix an arbitrary φ ∈ ΦB .
Define the following belief revision frame: T = {t0},= ∅, Ω = MPLB and, for every ω ∈ Ω , Bt0(ω) = It0(ω) = Mφ .
This is an Lb frame, since the properties of Definition 6 are trivially satisfied. Define the following model based on
this frame: for every atomic proposition q and for every ω ∈ Ω , (ω, t0) |= q if and only if q ∈ ω. As shown in part (A)
9 For every Boolean formula χ , K∗χ is the set of Boolean formulas believed at (α, t2) if (α, t2) |= Iχ .
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φt0 = Mφ . Fix an arbitrary α ∈ Ω . By construction, It0(α) = Mφ . Thus (α, t0) |= Iφ. Furthermore, if φ is
not a contradiction, then, by Lindenbaum’s lemma, Mφ 
= ∅ so that there exists a β ∈ MPLB with φ ∈ β . Thus, by (1),
(β, t0) |= φ. 
The following proposition shows that logic LAGM characterizes the full set of AGM postulates.
Proposition 12. Logic LAGM provides an axiomatic characterization of the full set of AGM postulates (K*1)–(K*8),
in the sense that both (A) and (B) below hold:
(A) Let K ⊆ ΦB be a consistent and deductively closed set and φ,ψ ∈ ΦB . If K∗φ,K∗φ∧ψ ⊆ ΦB satisfy AGM
postulates (K*1)–(K*8) then there is an LAGM-model, t1, t2, t3 ∈ T and α ∈ Ω such that
(A.1) t1 t2,
(A.2) K = {χ ∈ ΦB : (α, t1) |= Bχ},
(A.3) (α, t2) |= Iφ,
(A.4) K∗φ = {χ ∈ ΦB : (α, t2) |= Bχ},
(A.5) if φ is consistent then (β, t) |= φ for some β ∈ Ω and t ∈ T ,
(A.6) t1 t3,
(A.7) (α, t3) |= I (φ ∧ψ),
(A.8) K∗φ∧ψ = {χ ∈ ΦB : (α, t3) |= Bχ},
(A.9) if (φ ∧ψ) is consistent then (γ, t ′) |= (φ ∧ψ) for some γ ∈ Ω and t ′ ∈ T .
(B) Fix an LAGM-model such that (1) for some t1, t2, t3 ∈ T , α ∈ Ω and φ,ψ ∈ ΦB , t1 t2, t1 t3, (α, t2) |= Iφ
and (α, t3) |= I (φ ∧ ψ), (2) if φ is not a contradiction then (β, t) |= φ, for some β ∈ Ω and t ∈ T and (3) if (φ ∧ ψ)
is not a contradiction then (γ, t ′) |= (φ ∧ ψ), for some γ ∈ Ω and t ′ ∈ T . Define K = {χ ∈ ΦB : (α, t1) |= Bχ},
K∗φ = {χ ∈ ΦB : (α, t2) |= Bχ} and K∗φ∧ψ = {χ ∈ ΦB : (α, t3) |= Bχ}. Then K∗φ and K∗φ∧ψ satisfy AGM postulates
(K*1)–(K*8). Furthermore, for every φ,ψ ∈ ΦB , there exists an LAGM-model such that, for some α ∈ Ω and t2, t3 ∈
T , (1) (α, t2) |= Iφ and (α, t3) |= I (φ ∧ψ), (2) if φ is not a contradiction then (β, t) |= φ, for some β ∈ Ω and t ∈ T
and (3) if (φ ∧ψ) is not a contradiction then (γ, t ′) |= (φ ∧ψ), for some γ ∈ Ω and t ′ ∈ T .
Proof. (A) First we prove that if K ⊆ ΦB is consistent and deductively closed, φ,ψ ∈ ΦB and K∗φ,K∗φ∧ψ ⊆ ΦB
satisfy AGM postulates (K*1)–(K*8) then there is an LAGM-model, t1, t2, t3 ∈ T and α ∈ Ω such that (A.1)–(A.9)
are satisfied. We proceed as in the proof of Proposition 11. Thus MPLB denotes the set of maximally consistent sets of
formulas for a propositional logic whose set of formulas is ΦB and, for F ⊆ ΦB , let MF = {ω ∈ MPLB : F ⊆ ω}.
Define the following belief revision frame: T = {t1, t2, t3},= {(t1, t2), (t1, t3)}, Ω = MPLB and, for every ω ∈ Ω ,
Bt1(ω) = It1(ω) = MK
It2(ω) =
{ ∅ if φ is a contradiction
Mφ otherwise
Bt2(ω) =
⎧⎨
⎩
∅ if φ is a contradiction
Mφ ∩ MK if φ is consistent and Mφ ∩ MK 
= ∅
MK∗φ if φ is consistent and Mφ ∩ MK = ∅
It3(ω) =
{ ∅ if φ ∧ψ is a contradiction
Mφ∧ψ otherwise
Bt3(ω) =
⎧⎨
⎩
∅ if φ ∧ψ is a contradiction
Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK if φ ∧ψ is consistent and Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK 
= ∅
MK∗φ∧ψ if φ ∧ψ is consistent and Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK = ∅.
First we show that this frame is an LAGM-frame (see Definition 8). Note that Bt1 , It1 , Bt2 and It2 are the same as in
the Lb-frame defined in the proof of Proposition 11. Thus we only need to focus on the additional elements.
The Qualitative Bayes Rule is satisfied, since Bt1(ω) ∩ It3(ω) 
= ∅ if and only if MK ∩ Mφ∧ψ 
= ∅, in which case
Bt (ω) = MK ∩ Mφ∧ψ = Bt (ω)∩ It (ω).3 1 3
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where t = t3 and φ ∧ ψ is a consistent formula. If Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK 
= ∅, then Bt3(ω) = Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK ⊆ Mφ∧ψ = It3(ω).
If Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK = ∅ then Bt3(ω) = MK∗φ∧ψ and It3(ω) = Mφ∧ψ . Now, if ω ∈ MK∗φ∧ψ then K∗φ∧ψ ⊆ ω and, since by
AGM postulate (K*2), φ ∧ψ ∈ K∗φ∧ψ , it follows that φ ∧ψ ∈ ω, that is, ω ∈ Mφ∧ψ . Hence MK∗φ∧ψ ⊆ Mφ∧ψ .
The property that, for every ω and t , Bt (ω) 
= ∅ whenever It (ω) 
= ∅ is also satisfied. The only case left to examine
is the case where t = t3. Now, It3(ω) 
= ∅ if and only if φ ∧ ψ is a consistent formula; in this case either Bt3(ω) =
Mφ∧ψ ∩MK , if Mφ∧ψ ∩MK 
= ∅, or Bt3(ω) = MK∗φ∧ψ , in which case, by AGM postulate (K*5), K∗φ∧ψ is a consistent
set and therefore, by Lindenbaum’s lemma, MK∗φ∧ψ 
= ∅.
Next we have to show that the LAGM-specific property CAB is satisfied, namely that if t1, t, t ′ and ω are such that
t1 t , t1 t ′, It ′(ω) ⊆ It (ω) and It ′(ω)∩Bt (ω) 
= ∅ then Bt ′(ω) = It ′(ω)∩Bt (ω).
We start with t = t3 and t ′ = t2. In this case the joint condition It2(ω) ⊆ It3(ω) and It2(ω)∩Bt3(ω) 
= ∅ holds only
if (φ ∧ ψ) is consistent (implying that φ is consistent) and Mφ ⊆ Mφ∧ψ , which implies that Mφ∧ψ = Mφ . This, in
turn, implies that (φ ∧ψ) ↔ φ is a tautology, so that, by AGM postulate (K*6), K∗φ∧ψ = K∗φ . Then
Bt2(ω) =
{
Mφ ∩ MK if Mφ ∩ MK 
= ∅
MK∗φ if Mφ ∩ MK = ∅
and
Bt3(ω) =
{
Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK = Mφ ∩ MK if Mφ ∩ MK 
= ∅
MK∗φ∧ψ = MK∗φ if Mφ ∩ MK = ∅.
Thus Bt2(ω) = Bt3(ω). Hence, since Bt2(ω) ⊆ It2(ω) (proved above for all t), it follows that Bt2(ω) = It2(ω)∩Bt3(ω).
Next we consider the case where t = t2 and t ′ = t3. In this case we do have that It3(ω) ⊆ It2(ω) (in fact, It3(ω) 
= ∅
if and only if φ ∧ψ is consistent, in which case φ must be consistent and then It2(ω) = Mφ and It3(ω) = Mφ∧ψ and
Mφ∧ψ ⊆ Mφ). Now, It3(ω)∩Bt2(ω) 
= ∅ only if φ∧ψ is consistent in which case It3(ω) = Mφ∧ψ . Assume, therefore,
that φ ∧ψ is consistent (which implies that φ is consistent). We need to consider several cases.
(i) Mφ∧ψ ∩MK 
= ∅. Then, since Mφ∧ψ ⊆ Mφ , Mφ ∩MK 
= ∅; it follows, by construction, that Bt2(ω) = Mφ ∩MK
and Bt3(ω) = Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK so that (since It3(ω) = Mφ∧ψ and Mφ∧ψ ⊆ Mφ) Bt3(ω) = It3(ω)∩Bt2(ω).
(ii) Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK = ∅ but Mφ ∩ MK 
= ∅. In this case Bt2(ω) = Mφ ∩ MK and thus It3(ω) ∩ Bt2(ω) = Mφ∧ψ ∩
MK = ∅ and therefore there is nothing to prove, since the requirement that Bt3(ω) = It3(ω) ∩ Bt2(ω) only holds if
It3(ω)∩Bt2(ω) 
= ∅.
(iii) Mφ ∩MK = ∅, which implies that Mφ∧ψ ∩MK = ∅. In this case Bt2(ω) = MK∗φ and Bt3(ω) = MK∗φ∧ψ , so that
It3(ω)∩Bt2(ω) 
= ∅ if and only if Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK∗φ 
= ∅. Assume this. Then it must be that ¬ψ /∈ K∗φ (if it were the case
that ¬ψ ∈ K∗φ , then we would have that ¬ψ ∈ ω for every ω ∈ MK∗φ , contradicting the fact that Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK∗φ 
= ∅).
Thus, by AGM postulates (K*7) and (K*8), K∗φ∧ψ = [K∗φ ∪ {ψ}]PL. We need to show that Bt3(ω) = It3(ω) ∩ Bt2(ω),
that is, that MK∗φ∧ψ = Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK∗φ . Let ω ∈ MK∗φ∧ψ . Then ω ⊇ K∗φ∧ψ = [K∗φ ∪ {ψ}]PL ⊇ K∗φ . Thus ω ∈ MK∗φ .
Furthermore, by AGM postulate (K*2), (φ ∧ ψ) ∈ K∗φ∧ψ , so that MK∗φ∧ψ ⊆ Mφ∧ψ . Thus MK∗φ∧ψ ⊆ Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK∗φ .
Next we prove that Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK∗φ ⊆ MK∗φ∧ψ . Since, by AGM postulate (K*2), φ ∈ K∗φ , [K∗φ ∪ {ψ}]PL = [K∗φ ∪ {φ ∧
ψ}]PL. Thus, if ω ∈ Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK∗φ then ω ⊇ [K∗φ ∪ {φ ∧ψ}]PL = [K∗φ ∪ {ψ}]PL = K∗φ∧ψ , that is, ω ∈ MK∗φ∧ψ .
Now define the following model based on this frame: for every atomic proposition q , for every ω ∈ Ω and for every
t ∈ T , (ω, t) |= q if and only if q ∈ ω. As in the proof of Proposition 11 (see (1)) it can be shown that, ∀χ ∈ ΦB ,
∀t ∈ T , χt = Mχ , that is, ∀ω ∈ Ω, (ω, t) |= χ if and only if χ ∈ ω. (4)
Recall also (see (2)) that, ∀F ⊆ ΦB,∀χ ∈ ΦB ,
χ ∈ [F ]PL if and only if χ ∈ ω, ∀ω ∈ MF . (5)
We need to show that properties (A.1)–(A.9) are satisfied. The proof of (A.1)–(A.5) is identical to the proof given for
Proposition 11 (since the current frame restricted to {t1, t2} coincides with the frame considered there). (A.6) is true
by construction. Thus we only need to prove (A.7)–(A.9).
(A.7): If (φ ∧ ψ) is a contradiction then φ ∧ ψt3 = ∅ and, by construction, It3(α) = ∅. If (φ ∧ ψ) is consistent,
by construction It3(α) = Mφ∧ψ and by (4) φ ∧ ψt3 = Mφ∧ψ . Thus, in either case, It3(α) = φ ∧ ψt3 , that is,
(α, t3) |= I (φ ∧ψ).
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(8.i) (φ ∧ψ) is a contradiction. Then, by AGM postulate (K*5), K∗φ∧ψ = ΦB and, by construction, Bt3(α) = ∅, so
that (α, t3) |= Bχ for every formula χ . Hence {χ ∈ ΦB : (α, t3) |= Bχ} = ΦB = K∗φ∧ψ .
(8.ii) (φ ∧ ψ) is consistent and Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK = ∅. In this case Bt3(α) = MK∗φ∧ψ . If χ ∈ K∗φ∧ψ then MK∗φ∧ψ ⊆ Mχ
and, by (4), Mχ = χt3 . Thus Bt3(α) ⊆ χt3 , that is, (α, t3) |= Bχ . Conversely, if (α, t3) |= Bχ then Bt3(α) ⊆ χt3
and, since Bt3(α) = MK∗φ∧ψ and, by (4), χt3 = Mχ , it follows that MK∗φ∧ψ ⊆ Mχ , that is, χ ∈ ω for all ω ∈ MK∗φ∧ψ .
It follows from (5) that χ ∈ [K∗φ∧ψ ]PL. By AGM postulate (K*1), K∗φ∧ψ = [K∗φ∧ψ ]PL. Thus χ ∈ K∗φ∧ψ .
(8.iii) (φ ∧ ψ) is consistent and Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK 
= ∅. In this case Bt3(α) = Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK . First of all, it must be that¬φ /∈ K (if ¬φ ∈ K then ¬φ ∈ ω for every ω ∈ MK , which would imply Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK = ∅, since φ ∈ ω for every
ω ∈ Mφ∧ψ ). Hence, by AGM postulates (K*3) and (K*4).
K∗φ = [K ∪ {φ}]PL. (6)
Secondly, it must be that
¬ψ /∈ [K ∪ {φ}]PL. (7)
In fact, if ¬ψ ∈ [K ∪ {φ}]PL then, since [K ∪ {φ}]PL ⊆ [K ∪ {φ ∧ ψ}]PL, ¬ψ ∈ [K ∪ {φ ∧ ψ}]PL which, by
(5), implies that ¬ψ ∈ ω for every ω ∈ MK∪{φ∧ψ}. Since ψ ∈ ω, for every ω ∈ MK∪{φ∧ψ}, this would imply that
MK∪{φ∧ψ} = ∅; however, since
MK∪{φ∧ψ} = Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK (8)
this contradicts the hypothesis that Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK 
= ∅.
It follows from (6) and (7) that ¬ψ /∈ K∗φ . Hence by AGM postulates (K*7) and (K*8),
K∗φ∧ψ = [K∗φ ∪ {ψ}]PL. (9)
Next we note that
[K ∪ {φ ∧ψ}]PL = [[K ∪ {φ}]PL ∪ {ψ}]PL. (10)
In fact, since φ → (ψ → (φ ∧ ψ)) is a tautology, (ψ → (φ ∧ ψ)) ∈ [K ∪ {φ}]PL. Thus (φ ∧ ψ) ∈ [[K ∪ {φ}]PL ∪
{ψ}]PL. Hence [K ∪ {φ ∧ψ}]PL ⊆ [[K ∪ {φ}]PL ∪ {ψ}]PL. To prove the converse, first note that, since φ ∈ [K ∪ {φ ∧
ψ}]PL, [K ∪ {φ}]PL ⊆ [K ∪ {φ ∧ ψ}]PL. Hence, since ψ ∈ [K ∪ {φ ∧ ψ}]PL, it follows that [[K ∪ {φ}]PL ∪ {ψ}]PL ⊆
[K ∪ {φ ∧ψ}]PL.
By (6), [[K ∪ {φ}]PL ∪ {ψ}]PL = [K∗φ ∪ {ψ}]PL and, by (9), [K∗φ ∪ {ψ}]PL = K∗φ∧ψ . Thus, by (10),
[K ∪ {φ ∧ψ}]PL = K∗φ∧ψ. (11)
By (5) for every χ ∈ ΦB , χ ∈ [K ∪ {φ ∧ ψ}]PL if and only if χ ∈ ω, for every ω ∈ MK∪{φ∧ψ}. It follows from this,
(8) and (11) that, for every χ ∈ ΦB , χ ∈ K∗φ∧ψ if and only if χ ∈ ω, for every ω ∈ Mφ∧ψ ∩ MK = Bt3(α). Since, by
(4), for every χ ∈ ΦB and ω ∈ Ω , χ ∈ ω if and only if (ω, t3) |= χ , it follows that, for every χ ∈ ΦB , χ ∈ K∗φ∧ψ if
and only if, for every ω ∈ Bt3(α), (ω, t3) |= χ , that is, if and only if (α, t3) |= Bχ .
(A.9): we need to show that, if (φ ∧ψ) is consistent, then (γ, t ′) |= (φ ∧ψ) for some γ ∈ Ω and t ′ ∈ T . If (φ ∧ψ)
is consistent, then by Lindenbaum’s lemma, there exists a γ ∈ MPLB such that (φ ∧ψ) ∈ β . By (4), (γ, t ′) |= φ ∧ψ for
all t ′ ∈ T .
(B) Fix an LAGM-model such that (1) for some t1, t2, t3 ∈ T , α ∈ Ω and φ,ψ ∈ ΦB , t1 t2, t1 t3, (α, t2) |= Iφ
and (α, t3) |= I (φ ∧ ψ), (2) if φ is not a contradiction then (β, t) |= φ, for some β ∈ Ω and t ∈ T and (3) if (φ ∧ ψ)
is not a contradiction then (γ, t ′) |= (φ ∧ψ), for some γ ∈ Ω and t ′ ∈ T . Define K = {χ ∈ ΦB : (α, t1) |= Bχ}, K∗φ =
{χ ∈ ΦB : (α, t2) |= Bχ} and K∗φ∧ψ = {χ ∈ ΦB : (α, t3) |= Bχ}. We need to show that K∗φ and K∗φ∧ψ satisfy AGM
postulates (K*1)–(K*8). The proof that AGM postulates (K*1)–(K*6) are satisfied is the same as in Proposition 11
(every LAGM-model is an Lb-model). Thus we shall only prove that AGM postulates (K*7) and (K*8) are satisfied.
First we show that (K*7) is satisfied, that is, that K∗φ∧ψ ⊆ [K∗φ ∪ {ψ}]PL. Fix an arbitrary χ ∈ K∗φ∧ψ , that is,
(α, t3) |= Bχ . By hypothesis, (α, t3) |= I (φ∧ψ). Thus (α, t3) |= I (φ∧ψ)∧Bχ and, since t1 t3, (α, t1) |=(I (φ∧
ψ) ∧ Bχ). By axiom K7 and Proposition 9, (α, t1) |= (I (φ ∧ ψ) ∧ Bχ) → ©(Iφ → B((φ ∧ ψ) → χ)). Hence
158 G. Bonanno / Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007) 144–160(α, t1) |= ©(Iφ → B((φ ∧ ψ) → χ)), from which it follows, since t1 t2, that (α, t2) |= Iφ → B((φ ∧ ψ) → χ).
By hypothesis, (α, t2) |= Iφ. Hence (α, t2) |= B(φ → (ψ → χ)) [since (φ ∧ ψ) → χ is tautologically equivalent to
φ → (ψ → χ)]. By axiom A and Proposition 9, (α, t2) |= Iφ → Bφ and by hypothesis (α, t2) |= Iφ. Thus (α, t2) |=
Bφ. By axiom K and Proposition 9, (α, t2) |= (B(φ → (ψ → χ)) ∧ Bφ) → B(ψ → χ). Thus (α, t2) |= B(ψ → χ),
that is, (ψ → χ) ∈ K∗φ . Hence χ ∈ [K∗φ ∪ {ψ}]PL.
Next we prove that (K*8) is satisfied, that is, that if ¬ψ /∈ K∗φ then [K∗φ ∪ {ψ}]PL ⊆ K∗φ∧ψ . Fix an arbitrary
χ ∈ [K∗φ ∪ {ψ}]PL. Then there exist φ1, . . . , φn ∈ K∗φ ∪ {ψ} such that (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn) → χ is a tautology. If φi ∈ K∗φ
for every i = 1, . . . , n then, since by AGM postulate (K*1) K∗φ is deductively closed (that is, K∗φ = [K∗φ]PL), χ ∈ K∗φ
and thus (ψ → χ) ∈ K∗φ (since χ → (ψ → χ) is a tautology). If φi /∈ K∗φ for some i then we can assume (renumbering
the formulas, if necessary) that φn /∈ K∗φ , from which it follows (since φi ∈ K∗φ ∪{ψ} for all i = 1, . . . , n) that φn = ψ .
Since, by hypothesis, (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn) → χ is a tautology and it is tautologically equivalent to (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn−1) →
(φn → χ) and φn = ψ , it follows that (ψ → χ) ∈ [K∗φ]PL = K∗φ . Thus
(ψ → χ) ∈ K∗φ, that is, (α, t2) |= B(ψ → χ). (12)
By hypothesis, ¬ψ /∈ K∗φ , that is, (α, t2) |= ¬B¬ψ . By axiom A and Proposition 9, (α, t2) |= Iφ → Bφ and by
hypothesis (α, t2) |= Iφ. Thus (α, t2) |= Bφ and, therefore, (α, t2) |= Bφ ∧ ¬B¬ψ . By Lemma 10 and Proposition 9,
(α, t2) |= (Bφ ∧ ¬B¬ψ) → ¬B¬(φ ∧ψ). Thus
(α, t2) |= ¬B¬(φ ∧ψ). (13)
By hypothesis, (α, t2) |= Iφ. This, together with (12) and (13) yields (α, t2) |= Iφ ∧ ¬B¬(φ ∧ ψ) ∧ B(ψ → χ).
Hence, since t1  t2, (α, t1) |= (Iφ ∧ ¬B¬(φ ∧ ψ) ∧ B(ψ → χ)). By axiom K8 and Proposition 9, (α, t1) |=(Iφ ∧ ¬B¬(φ ∧ ψ) ∧ B(ψ → χ)) → ©(I (φ ∧ ψ) → Bχ). Thus (α, t1) |= ©(I (φ ∧ ψ) → Bχ) from which it
follows, since t1 t3, that (α, t3) |= I (φ ∧ ψ) → Bχ . By hypothesis, (α, t3) |= I (φ ∧ ψ). Hence (α, t3) |= Bχ , that
is, χ ∈ K∗φ∧ψ .
It remains to show that for every φ,ψ ∈ ΦB , there exists an LAGM-model such that, for some α ∈ Ω and t2, t3 ∈ T ,
(1) (α, t2) |= Iφ and (α, t3) |= I (φ ∧ ψ), (2) if φ is not a contradiction then (β, t) |= φ, for some β ∈ Ω and t ∈ T
and (3) if (φ ∧ψ) is not a contradiction then (γ, t ′) |= (φ ∧ψ), for some γ ∈ Ω and t ′ ∈ T . Fix arbitrary φ,ψ ∈ ΦB .
Define the following belief revision frame: T = {t2, t3},= ∅, Ω = MPLB and, for every ω ∈ Ω , Bt2(ω) = It2(ω) =
Mφ and Bt3(ω) = It3(ω) = Mφ∧ψ . This is an LAGM frame, since the properties of Definition 8 are trivially satisfied.
Define the following model based on this frame: for every atomic proposition q , for every ω ∈ Ω and t ∈ T , (ω, t) |= q
if and only if q ∈ ω. Fix an arbitrary α ∈ Ω . By (4), φt2 = Mφ and φt3 = Mφ∧ψ . Thus (α, t2) |= Iφ and (α, t3) |=
I (φ ∧ ψ). Furthermore, if φ is not a contradiction, then, by Lindenbaum’s lemma, Mφ 
= ∅ so that there exists a
β ∈ MPLB with φ ∈ β . Thus, by (4), (β, t2) |= φ. Similarly, if (φ ∧ ψ) is not a contradiction, then, by Lindenbaum’s
lemma, Mφ∧ψ 
= ∅ so that there exists a γ ∈ MPLB with (φ ∧ψ) ∈ γ . Thus, by (4), (γ, t3) |= φ ∧ψ . 
For lack of a better expression, we referred to the results of Propositions 11 and 12 as “axiomatic characterizations”.
As pointed out by a reviewer, this expression is not entirely appropriate.10 Perhaps alternative expressions could be
“axiomatic representation” or “axiomatic counterpart”.
5. Related literature
Some of the ideas contained in this paper (in particular the modeling of information by means of a non-normal
modal operator) were first put forward in [5]. The framework in that paper was different, however, since it was not
based on branching-time structures and only two dates were considered with two associated belief operators, B0 (rep-
resenting initial beliefs) and B1 (representing revised beliefs). The main contribution of that paper was a soundness and
completeness result for the proposed logic with respect to the class of frames that satisfy the Qualitative Bayes Rule.
The interaction of a belief operator and a next-time operator is briefly discussed by Kraus and Lehmann [14]. They
propose three “plausible” axioms and state that “an open problem is to find a natural family of models for which
10 According to the reviewer, the expression “axiomatic characterization” is typically used to refer to a result that allows one to say “whatever is
valid in this formal system can be derived from this finite list of principles”.
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interaction properties between knowledge and beliefs (e.g. Bφ → KBφ: if the agent believes φ then he knows that he
believes φ). The interaction of knowledge and belief over time is further studied in Battigalli and Bonanno [2], where,
instead of introducing a temporal modality, they define a different belief and knowledge modality for each instant t :
Btφ reads “the individual believes φ at time t”. Within this framework they provide a characterization of a property
similar to the Qualitative Bayes Rule in terms of the axiom Btφ ↔ BtBt+1φ. For a discussion of this axiom and its
relationship to the Qualitative Bayes Rule see [5].
An approach related to the one suggested in this paper, but carried out in the situation calculus (extended to include
a belief operator), can be found in Shapiro et al. [21]. The authors discuss a variety of topics, including belief revision,
belief update and iterated belief change.
Instead of temporal logic, a number of authors have used dynamic modal logic to model belief revision (see
Fuhrmann [9], de Rijke [18], Segerberg [19,20], van Ditmarsch [7,8]). This approach is known as dynamic doxastic
logic. Despite some differences in the proposed logics, the common idea is to think of revision as a dynamic action.
Besides the standard belief operator B , these authors introduce, for every (Boolean) formula φ, a revision operator
[∗φ] with the intended interpretation of [∗φ]χ as “after performing the action of revising by φ the individual believes
that χ” (some authors also discuss the expansion operator [+φ] and the contraction operator [−φ]). These logics are
considerably more complex than ours: besides requiring the extra apparatus of dynamic logic, they involves an infinite
number of modal operators (one for each formula φ), while our logic uses only three operators.
A modal logic analysis of belief revision was recently proposed by Board [3]. His approach also uses an infinite
number of modal operators: for every formula φ, an operator Bφ is introduced, representing the hypothetical beliefs
of the individual in the case where she learns that φ. Thus the interpretation of Bφψ is “upon learning that φ, the
individual believes that ψ”. On the semantic side, Board considers a set of states and a collection of binary relations,
one for each state, representing the plausibility ordering of the individual at that state. The truth condition for the
formula Bφψ at a state expresses the idea that the individual believes that ψ on learning that φ if and only if ψ is true
in all the most plausible worlds in which φ is true. The author gives a list of axioms which is sound and complete with
respect to the semantics. The infinite collection of belief operators in Board’s framework is what makes it possible
for him to compare revisions based on different hypothetical pieces of information. Time does not enter his analysis.
Instead we use an information operator to model the information actually received by the individual at any instant and
the comparison of revisions based on different pieces of information is made possible by the branching-time structure
and the associated temporal operator.
For further discussion of literature that is somewhat related to the general approach proposed in this paper, the
reader is referred to [5].
6. Conclusion
We proposed a temporal logic where information and beliefs are modeled explicitly by means of two modal op-
erators I and B , respectively. A branching-time structure with the associated next-time operator makes it possible to
compare different belief revisions following the receipt of different pieces of information. The proposed logic provides
an axiomatic system that corresponds to the AGM postulates for belief revision.
One of the advantages of modeling belief revision in modal logic is that properties of beliefs can be stated in a
clear and transparent way by means of syntactic axioms. Another advantage of the approach proposed in this paper
is that it offers a uniform treatment of static and dynamic beliefs, thus providing a unified framework for both. Static
beliefs would correspond to the case where the set of instants T is a singleton. All the properties of beliefs studied
in the static approach (see Hintikka [12]), such as consistency (Bφ → ¬B¬φ), positive introspection (Bφ → BBφ)
and negative introspection (¬Bφ → B¬Bφ), can be added to our list of axioms to provide stronger logics, which we
intend to study in future work.
It is also worth noting that the branching-time structure considered here provides a natural framework for studying
iterated belief revision, a topic that has received considerable attention in recent years (see, for example, Nayak
et al. [17]). Since the framework allows for a sequence of revisions based on a sequence of pieces of information,
an interesting topic for future research is whether the principles for iterated revision that have been proposed in the
literature can be translated into syntactic axioms.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof that L0 is sound with respect to the class of temporal belief revision frames is
along the usual lines (see [4] or [6]). We need to show that (1) the rules of inference are validity preserving and (2)
the axioms of L0 are valid in an arbitrary temporal belief revision frame. The proof of (1) is entirely standard and
is omitted. The proof of validity of axiom K for ©, ©−1 and A and for the temporal axioms (O1) and (O2) is also
standard and is omitted.
Validity of the backward uniqueness axiom (BU ) is an immediate consequence of the fact that in a belief revision
frame every instant t has at most a unique immediate predecessor: if (ω, t2) |=−1φ then there exists a t1 such that
t1 t2 and (ω, t1) |= φ. Since, for every t ∈ T , t t2 if and only if t = t1, it follows that (ω, t2) |= ©−1φ.
Validity of the S5 axioms for A is also straightforward. Suppose that (α, t) |= Aφ. Then (ω, t) |= φ for every
ω ∈ Ω , thus in particular for ω = α. Similarly, if (α, t) |= ¬Aφ then there exists a β ∈ Ω such that (β, t) |= ¬φ.
Hence (ω, t) |= ¬Aφ for every ω ∈ Ω and therefore (α, t) |= A¬Aφ.
The proof that the inclusion axiom for B (InclB) is valid is straightforward and is omitted.
Validity of axiom I1: Iφ ∧ Iψ → A(φ ↔ ψ). Suppose that (α, t) |= Iφ ∧ Iψ . Then It (α) = φt and It (α) =
ψt . Thus φt = ψt and hence φ ↔ ψt = Ω , yielding (α, t) |= A(φ ↔ ψ).
Validity of axiom I2: A(φ ↔ ψ) → (Iφ ↔ Iψ). Suppose that (α, t) |= A(φ ↔ ψ). Then φ ↔ ψt = Ω and,
therefore, φt = ψt . Thus, (α, t) |= Iφ if and only if It (α) = φt , if and only if It (α) = ψt , if and only if
(α, t) |= Iψ . Hence (α, t) |= Iφ ↔ Iψ . 
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